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We analyze the role of state-ownership in the banking sector from the
perspective of competition. Considering both the market for mortgage
loans and the market for savings and investment deposits in Switzerland,
we test three hypothesis: (i) Is the conduct followed by the state-owned
"cantonal banks" consistent with marginal cost pricing? (ii) Do cantonal
banks charge and/or oﬀer relatively customer friendly interest rates? And
(iii) is competition intensiﬁed by the conduct and presence of cantonal
banks. Based on a detailed database containing information at the indi-
vidual bank level over the 1996-2002 period, the answer is: "No".
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The Swiss banking sector is characterized by levels of concentration which are
remarkably high in international comparison, with the major two banks holding
about two-thirds of total assets. Moreover, it has been organized as a (legal)
cartel in its recent past: a few ”big banks” have been setting national reference
rates until 1997. Nonetheless, despite of this market-power prone environment,
the empirical evidence suggests that the pricing in the Swiss banking sector is
relatively moderate.
Moderate pricing in a concentrated market is not necessarily surprising, as
this might reﬂect the beneﬁts of natural selection in an industry characterized
by economies of scale. The plausibility of this hypothesis seems questionable,
however, in a market where 97% of the banks account for only about 10% of
total assets, i.e. banks of very diﬀerent scale coexist. An alternative hypothesis,
which we will explore in this paper, is that this situation reﬂects the competition
enhancing eﬀect of not-for-proﬁt state-owned "cantonal banks".
In a world à la Arrow-Debreu, the question of ownership is irrelevant. As-
suming, among others, that markets are perfectly competitive, a proﬁtm a x i -
mizing bank achieving zero excess proﬁti se x p e c t e dt ob e h a v ej u s tl i k ei t ss o c i a l
welfare maximizing state-owned counterpart. When departing from this hypo-
thetical world, however, diﬀerences in ownership, which translate into diﬀerences
in objective functions, may matter. Regarding pricing, state-owned ﬁrms’ ob-
jective — maximize welfare or more realistically achieve zero-proﬁt—i ss u p e r i o r
from a consumer — and generally welfare — point of view than maximizing prof-
its. Hence, state-owned ﬁrms might adopt a more consumer-friendly pricing
and, by aﬀecting the demand function faced by competing proﬁt maximizing
ﬁrms, reduce thereby their ability to extract consumer surplus.
The creation of the cantonal banks in Switzerland has been motivated along
these lines. They were established in the second half of the 19th century with the
basic mandate to stimulate economic development in their respective canton, i.e.
in one of the 26 political states which form Switzerland. While the exact terms
of their mandates are generally vague, some cantonal banks are explicitly given
the mandate to intensify competition through customer friendly interest rates.
Figures regarding proﬁtability are also consistent with a zero (economic) proﬁt
objective, even though this objective is not explicitly formulated: the cantonal
banks’ return on assets over the 1987-2002 period was 0.21% as compared to
0.48% for the banking sector as a whole. Based on this, and on the fact that
cantonal banks are major players in most cantons, it seems natural to assume
that cantonal banks play a special — and from a borrower or lenders’ perspective
beneﬁcial — role in the Swiss banking sector. The goal of our paper is to show
if what seems a natural assumption is supported by the data.
Our starting point is to consider that diﬀerences in the objective function
should lead to visible diﬀerences in the banks’ conduct. That is, we expect
the conduct followed by cantonal banks to deviate from the conduct which is
typical in the banking sector. More precisely, in the light of their mandate, we
expect their conduct to deviate in a way which directly or indirectly beneﬁts
2borrowers and lenders. We would in particular expect cantonal banks to follow
a relatively aggressive pricing policy that should translate into relatively low
interest rates on mortgages and relatively high interest rates on deposits. An-
other, less obvious, consequence of a relatively aggressive pricing policy should
be a relatively high price sensitivity to common cost movements (pass-through
rates), i.e. relatively close to the unitary pass-through rate implied by mar-
ginal cost pricing. Finally, in a market where banks interact, we would expect
cantonal banks’ deviating conduct to interfere with, and aﬀect their competing
banks’ conduct. The underlying assumption is that cantonal banks may aﬀect
the equilibrium outcome of a market in a way which goes beyond their direct
eﬀect on the average interest rate in that market.
We test those assumptions using a detailed database containing information
at the individual bank level and covering the 1996-2002 period. Under the line,
our data provide no evidence in support of these assumptions. First it appears
that, whenever diﬀerent, cantonal banks’ pass through rates are generally lower
than the typical pass through rate in the industry. Second, most of our results
suggest that even after controlling for portfolio characteristics cantonal banks
tend to charge higher interest rates on their mortgages and grant lower interest
rates on their deposits than the typical bank in Switzerland. Third, we ﬁnd no
evidence that the interest rates are particularly borrower or lender friendly in
those cantons where the presence of cantonal banks is particularly strong.
T h em a i nl e s s o nf r o mt h e s eﬁndings is that, based on the Swiss case, state
ownership does not appear to be an eﬀective instrument to enhance competition
in the banking sector. As a consequence, it may be worth reconsidering the
rationale of state-ownership in a sector which oﬀers no obvious public goods
characteristics. And the relevance of this issue is not limited to Switzerland:
According to La Porta et al. (2002, table I) in the average country, worldwide,
42% of the equity of the 10 largest banks was owned by the government in 1995.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in section 2, we brieﬂys u r v e y
the related literature. Section 3 contains an example of the potential role played
by state-owned banks in a market with horizontal product diﬀerentiation. This
example serves as an illustration of the mechanism we focus on in the empirical
analysis which is developed in section 4 to 6. We summarizes our results and
discuss our ﬁndings in section 7. Finally, we present the policy implications and
conclude in section 8.
2 Related literature
The question of the relative merits of state- versus private-ownership has been
a widely discussed and recurrent topic for many decades and has generated an
ample literature.1 Shirley and Walsh (2000) provide a broad review of this liter-
ature. On a theoretical level and from a general point of view, the main line of
1For work on the value of state ownership in oligopolistic markets see, among others, De
Fraja and Delbono (1989) or Cremer et al. (1989).
3argumentation can be summarized as follows: state-ownership should in princi-
ple be preferred whenever some form of market failures, in particular insuﬃcient
competition, prevails; however, given information and incentive related issues,
the dominance of state-ownership over private-ownership is not guaranteed even
in the presence of market failure. Consistently, the empirical evidence is mixed
but, in general privately owned ﬁrms turn out to be more eﬃcient than their
publicly-owned counterparts. Moreover, when considering the (small) subset
of studies which focus on pricing and hence are of particular relevance to us,
privately ownership unambiguously dominate, i.e. oﬀer more friendly consumer
pricing than public owned ﬁrms.2
Regarding the banking sector, the number of papers addressing the issue of
the conduct and/or the relative performance of state-ownership is quite modest.
To our knowledge, all the papers are empirical and only a few focus explicitly
on pricing. La Porta et al. (2002) study the relationship at the macro level
between growth and government versus privately ownership of banks. They
conclude that more government ownership in the banking sector is traditionally
associated with slower subsequent ﬁnancial development and lower growth of
per capita income and productivity. More in line with our work, i.e. at a more
disaggregated level and with a stronger focus on performance within the banking
market, Molyneux and Forbes (1995) show that state-owned banks were more
proﬁtable than other banks in Europe in the late 1980s. They do not however
speciﬁcally address the question of pricing. The Swiss banking sector has already
been the object of a few studies that tackle the issue of state-ownership. Egli
and Rime (1999), for example, analyze the Swiss banking sector and, while
addressing the more general question of the relationship between concentration
and pricing, they test the potential eﬀect of state-owned bank on interest rates:
controlling for market concentration they reject the hypothesis of consumer
friendly pricing by dominant state-owned banks. Shaﬀer (2002) explores the
conduct of the diﬀerent categories of banks in Switzerland, among them the
state-owned cantonal banks. Using aggregate data, he concludes that cantonal
banks appear to have exercised no market power during the period considered
(1979-1991) while the big and the foreign banks seem to have enjoyed a degree
of monopoly power during the same period. Finally Rime and Stiroh (2003)
also investigate the Swiss banking sector with a focus on eﬃciency and come to
the conclusion that state-owned banks are not less eﬃcient than their privately
owned counterparts.
From a methodological point of view, our research is also closely linked to
recent work on the competitive role of credit unions in the banking sector.
W h i l et h ef o c u si so nad i ﬀerent category of banks, the questions raised and
the methodology employed to tackle those questions are similar. Among those
studies, Feinberg (2002) investigates the pro-competitive role of credit-unions.
B a s e do nap a n e lo fU Sd a t a ,h eﬁnds evidence of a negative relationship between
the market share of credit unions in the saving market an their own interest
2According to the authors, only 3 studies, out of 52, compare the relative performance of
publicly- and privately-owned banks based on prices. See Shirley and Walsh (2000), table 1,
p. 50-51.
4rates in the loan market. He interprets this result as an indication that credit
unions should be seen as price-taking fringe competitors and play an important
pro-competitive role in the banking market.
While related to the existing literature, and in particular to Egli and Rime
(1999), our research diﬀerentiates itself along at least two important dimensions.
First regarding the dataset: the 1996-2002 period we focus on allows us to
use previously unavailable data on banks’ portfolio characteristics. This data
allow us in particular to risk-adjust the interest rates on mortgages in a more
accurate way than used to be possible using the traditional measure, i.e. loan-
loss reserves. Second, and more important, this paper is, to the best of our
knowledge, the ﬁrst systematic study of the conduct and the competitive role
of state-owned banks.
3 The role of state-owned banks as competition
enhancer: an illustrative example
In this section, we illustrate the potential role of a state-owned bank following
a zero-proﬁt objective using the Hotelling (1929) set-up.3 This set-up seems
particularly well suited to competition in the banking sector where product
diﬀerentiation and, in particular geographical distance between bank branches,
seem to play a major role, as was recently underlined by Petersen and Rajan
(2002) and Degryse and Ongena (2002).
We assume a linear city of length 1 which is home to a continuum of uniformly
with unit density distributed borrowers with an inelastic demand for bank loans.
There are 3 banks, labelled 1 to 3, located along the main road at a1,a 2 and a3
respectively. To account for the horizontal product diﬀerentiation, it is assumed
that borrowers incur a quadratic "transportation cost" when borrowing from a
b a n kw h i c hl o c a t i o nd i ﬀers from theirs. We further assume that the marginal
cost of producing banking services is zero.
This set-up allows us to compare 3 diﬀerent cases. In case 1, we assume
that two proﬁt maximizing banks compete — sequentially, ﬁrst in location and
then, given locations, in price — with a state-owned bank, located at a2 = 1
2,
which follows a zero-proﬁto b j e c t i v e .I nc a s e2 ,w ea s s u m et h a tt h es t a t e - o w n e d
bank is privatized, i.e. becomes a proﬁt maximizer, while locations are assumed
to remain unchanged. In case 3, locations are endogenized, i.e. three proﬁt
maximizing banks sequentially compete in locations and prices. This simple
set-up allows us to highlight the fact that state-owned banks with a zero-proﬁt
objective aﬀect the equilibrium outcome directly, by applying diﬀerent prices
and indirectly by modifying the other banks’ optimal choices regarding pricing
and location. We leave the details of the calculation in the appendix and focus
on the main results, which are summarized in table 1 below.
In case I, the proﬁt maximizing banks’ locate at aI
1 =0 .167 and aI
3 =1−aI
1
respectively and charge an interest rate rI
1 = rI
3 = 1
9. By deﬁnition, the state
3See Tirole (1988), chap. 7, for a reader’s digest version of the model.
5owned bank charges rI
2 =0 . In this case, two-thirds of the population borrow










6. The average — and, given the population of size 1, total
— interest rate paid by the borrowers is ¯ rI =0 .037. In addition, the borrowers
pay TI =0 .028 in form of transportation costs.
In case II, bank 2 is now assumed to be a proﬁt-maximiser. However, we
assume that step 1’s locational pattern {a1,a 2,a 3} is unchanged. Under this
constellation, the average interest rate paid in the city is now ¯ rII =0 .169. As
compared to case I, the average transportation cost decreases slightly — reﬂecting
the bigger uniformity of the market shares — but transportation costs only plays
a minor role: the average interest and transportation cost paid increases from
¯ rI + TI =0 .07 to ¯ rII + TII =0 .18.
Finally, case III depicts the equilibrium when proﬁts are maximized both
through the choice of the optimal location and the optimal pricing. As can
be seen, the optimal locational structure, is characterized by a slightly higher
level of geographical diﬀerentiation which allows banks to further increase their






2 =0 .172 >r III
2 . This in turn leads to a higher average
interest rate ¯ rIII =0 .19 > ¯ rIII as well as a slightly higher transportation cost.
While only illustrative, this example highlights the potential role of a state-
owned bank in an industry with less than perfect competition due to horizontal
product diﬀerentiation and barriers to entry: borrowers beneﬁt not only from its
lower pricing but also from its impact — due to its non-strategic spatial behavior
— on the conduct of its proﬁt maximizing competitors.
Table 1
r1 X1 a1 r2 X2 a2 ¯ rT ¯ r + T
Case I
State-owned bank
(locations endogenous) .11 .17 .17 0 .67 1
2 .04 .03 .07
Case II
Only proﬁt maximizing banks
(locations exogenous) .19 .28 .17 .15 .44 1
2 .17 .01 .18
Case III
Only proﬁt maximizing banks
(locations endogenous) .20 .27 .13 .17 .46 1
2 .19 .01 .20
4D a t a a n d m e t h o d o l o g y
We focus on two markets: the mortgage loans and the savings and investment
deposits markets. Those markets suit our purpose particularly well. In partic-
ular, the mortgage loans and deposits markets are widely dominated by banks.
6For instance, banks own about 90% of all mortgage loans outstanding in Switzer-
land. As a consequence, focusing on the banking industry, i.e. ignoring other
actors like the insurance industry should not prevent us from identifying the
major forces at play in those markets. In addition, and most important, the
structure of the Swiss banking sector and the data available provide us with
an almost ideal laboratory to investigate the inﬂuence of state-ownership on
the equilibrium outcome in the banking sector. We see three reasons for that.
First, theoretical and empirical considerations suggest that the relevant market
for mortgages and deposits tends to be relatively small. This allows us to treat
each canton as a separate market making and take full advantage of the fact that
24 of Switzerland’s 26 cantons share a similar structure, with one cantonal bank
(CB hereafter) competing with numerous privately owned banks.4 Second, the
CBs are major players at the cantonal level, with average market shares that
exceed 30% in both the mortgage and the deposit market (see table 2). Third,
the concentration in the Swiss banking sector is high in both the mortgage and
the deposit markets (see table 2). The Herﬁndahl index of concentration varies
between about 2’300 to 2’800 depending on the year and the market considered.
These ﬁgures are (unweighted) averages over all cantons. In some cantons, the
index exceeds 6’500 in the deposits market and 7’800 in the mortgage market.
As a point of comparison, according to the DOJ Merger Guidelines in force in
the United States, the threshold above which a planned merger is considered
potentially harmful for competition is 1’800. These elements, together with the
fact that our dataset provides us with details regarding the geographical distri-
bution of the individual banks’ mortgage and deposits portfolios, suggest that
the Swiss banking sector oﬀers appealing characteristics for the study of the
impact of market structure — and the role of state-ownership as an element of
this structure — on banks’ conduct.
Besides information on the size and the geographical distribution of the
banks’ mortgage and deposits portfolios, our dataset includes information on
pricing as well as variables that reﬂect the individual banks’ portfolio structure.
These variables potentially play a central role — as control variables — when
explaining diﬀerences in interest rates between banks or through time. For in-
stance, our dataset includes an indicator of the riskiness of the banks’ mortgage
portfolio (variable RISK) as well as an indicator of the interest rate adjustment
constraint they are subject to (variable FREE). The exact role in our context
of those, and the remaining variables reported in table 2, will be highlighted in
the next section, when describing the content of our econometric speciﬁcations.
Table 2: Summary Statistics5
[Insert table 2 about here]
Using these data, we test 3 hypothesis. First, we test if the CBs interest
rates sensitivity to common cost movements (pass-through rates) are relatively
4See Egli and Rime (1999) for a general discussion regarding the size of the relevant market
in banking with an application to Switzerland.
7high. More speciﬁcally we test the hypothesis of identical pass-through
rates against the alternative that state-owned banks’ pass-through
rates are higher than privately owned banks’ (hypothesis 1).T h i s
assumption draws on the following proposition (the proof is left in Appendix 3):
Proposition 1 Consider a market where N proﬁt maximizing banks compete
with K zero-proﬁt (state-owned). Under the following assumptions: (i) both cat-
egories of banks are identical except for their objective function, (ii) the market
is characterized by horizontal product diﬀerentiation, (iii) banks compete à la
Nash in interest rates, (iv) the price-elasticity of individual and total demand










where rj is the Nash-equilibrium interest rate charged by the N proﬁt-maximizing
banks, ˙ r is the opportunity cost of funds and r∗
k is the equilibrium interest rate
charged by zero-proﬁt (state-owned) banks.
Proposition 1 captures the fact that diﬀerences in the objective function
should lead to diﬀerences in the pass-through rates. Proﬁt maximizing banks,
which beneﬁt from some degree of market power should report only a fraction
of the marginal cost movements into their interest rates while banks following
az e r o - p r o ﬁt objective should report it entirely. Hence we test if state-owned
banks’ pricing policy is compatible with — or as compared to privately owned
banks is closer to be compatible with — marginal cost pricing.
Second, we test if the CBs’ interest rates are relatively consumer friendly.
More speciﬁcally, we test the hypothesis of equal pricing against the
alternative that state-owned banks charge relatively low interest rates
on their mortgages and/or oﬀer relatively high interest rates on their
deposits (hypothesis 2).
H y p o t h e s i s1a n d2r e ﬂect two aspects of the same assumption according
to which, to be in line with their mandate and valuable from a borrower and
lender perspective, the CBs should adopt a relatively aggressive conduct re-
garding pricing. It is important to underline that while hypothesis 1 and 2 are
closely linked, they convey complementary information. For instance, rejecting
assumption 1 in favour of the proposed alternative while failing to reject assump-
tion 2 could reﬂect the fact that state-owned banks follow a relatively aggressive
pricing policy but are, in parallel, characterized by a relatively ineﬃcient cost
structure.
Third, we test if the conduct of the CBs competitors regarding pricing is
aﬀected by the strength of the CB’s presence, i.e. we test the assumption that
CBs aﬀect the equilibrium outcome of a market in a way which goes beyond
their direct eﬀect on the average interest rate in that market. More speciﬁcally,
we test the hypothesis that privately-owned banks’ pricing does not
depend on the strength of the CBs’ presence against the alternative
that privately owned banks charge lower interest rates on mortgages
8and/or oﬀer higher interest rates on deposits when facing a stronger
CB (hypothesis 3). Hypothesis 3 is linked to hypothesis 1 and 2 in the
following way: failing to reject hypothesis 1 and 2 would suggest that the CBs’
conduct regarding pricing is observationally equivalent to their privately owned
c o u n t e r p a r t ’ s .T h i ss i t u a t i o ns h o u l db ec o n s i s t e n tw i t hp r i v a t e l yo w n e db a n k s ’
pricing policy not depending on the nature of their competitors, i.e. would be
consistent with failing to reject hypothesis 3. On the other hand, rejecting either
hypothesis 1 or 2 would be consistent with the rejection of hypothesis 3.
5H y p o t h e s i s 1 : p a s s - t h r o u g h r a t e s
In this section we test the hypothesis of identical price sensitivity to shocks
(or pass-through rates) against the alternative that state-owned banks’ pass-
through rates are higher than privately owned banks’
5.1 Mortgage loans: speciﬁcation


















where ∆ measures the year on year change of a variable, RM is an indicator of
the average interest rate on mortgages charged by bank i in canton j at time
t. We will come back to the exact deﬁnition of RM below. α0 is a vector of
constants, and ICB is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 when bank i
is a cantonal bank and zero otherwise.
LIBOR is a variable measuring the interest rate conditions on the interbank
market,6 which we use as an indicator for the opportunity cost of funds. We
expect α
M,I
1 to be positive: an increase in the interest rate on the interbank
market should lead to an increase in the average interest rate charged by banks
on their mortgage portfolio (positive pass-through rate). The parameter of
interest is αI
2 : we test the hypothesis that the state-owned banks’ pass-through
rate is higher than their privately-owned counterparts, i.e. we test the null-
hypothesis α
M,I
2 =0against the alternative α
M,I
2 > 0.




2 , are likely to depend on the interest-rates
term structure of the mortgage portfolios: interest rates on mortgages are often
contractually set at a given level over a given period of time. Fortunately,
our data allow us to account for this dimension, which is not a priori linked
to diﬀerences in the objective function of a bank: the variable FREE is the
fraction of the mortgage portfolio for each bank and for each year which is not
subject to any interest rate adjustment constraint. Hence, we use the adjusted
average interest rate RM = rM
FREE, where rM is the average interest rate charged
6London Interbank Oﬀered Rate.
9by a bank on its mortgage portfolio, as dependant variable. By doing this, we
implicitly assume that only the interest rate charged on the FREE portion of
a bank’s mortgage portfolio varies in response to a change aﬀecting the RHS
variables in (1).
We include a variable controlling for changes in the riskiness of the bank’s
mortgage portfolio (∆RISK). As an indicator for riskiness, we use the fraction
of the mortgage portfolio which is categorized second and third rank, i.e. for
which the loan to value ratios exceed 67%. We expect α
M,I
3 to be positive as,
all things equal, an increase of the riskiness of a mortgage portfolio should be
reﬂected by higher interest rates on that portfolio.
To capture possible shifts in the demand function for mortgages, we include
a measure of the economic growth at the cantonal level (∆GDP) as a control
variable, with a positive expected sign for its coeﬃcient: all things equal, an
increase in economic activity should be characterized by an increase in the de-
mand for mortgages which should in turn lead to an increase in the interest rates
in the mortgage market. The inclusion of this control variable is particularly
important as one would expect changes in the LIBOR,w h i c hr e ﬂect changes in
the monetary policy of the Swiss National Banks, to be correlated with changes
in the economic activity (∆GDP). Hence, omitting the variable would lead to




2 .7 Finally, to allow for the possibility of a
trend in the rate of growth of the interest rates charged on mortgages during
the period considered, we include a linear time variable (TIME).8
5.2 Savings and investment deposits: speciﬁcation













3 ∆SAVINGS + εS,I (2)
where rS is the average interest rate on savings and investment deposits paid
by bank i in canton j at time t. The variables ICB and LIBOR have all been
deﬁned in the previous section. To account for a change in the interest rate
paid pay a bank on its deposits that would reﬂect a change in the composition
of these deposits — rather than a change in pricing — we include the variable
∆SAVINGS. This variable measures the changes in the share of savings de-
posits to total (savings and investment) deposits. In our sample, the average
interest rate paid on savings deposits is higher than the interest rate paid on
investment deposits. Hence, we expect α
S,I
3 to be positive.







, and test the hypothesis that the state-owned banks’ pass-
through rate is higher than their privately-owned counterparts, i.e. we test the
null-hypothesis α
S,I
2 =0against the alternative α
S,I
2 > 0.
7The Swiss National Banks uses the 3-months libor as its reference interest rate for its
monetary policy since beginning of 2000.
8The TIME variable is inlcuded throughout our analyis. To simplify the notation, it does
not explicitly appear in the equations describing the various speciﬁcations.
105.3 Results
The parameters of (1) and (2) are estimated using OLS after eliminating outliers
using the hadimvo9 procedure proposed by Stata. The statistical signiﬁcance
of the coeﬃcient is measured on the basis of robust standard-errors, i.e. com-
puted using the Huber White sandwich estimator of variance. We both estimate
the parameters on the basis of a pooled regression and allowing for bank-level
ﬁxed eﬀects. When considering bank-level ﬁxed eﬀects, diﬀerences regarding
the trend followed by interest rates on mortgages or deposits, which reﬂect sys-
tematic diﬀerences between banks, are left unexplained and the focus is on the
statistical link between changes of the opportunity cost of funds (∆LIBOR)
and banks’ interest rate movements around those trends. In the second case
(pooled), the estimation of the parameters is based on the cross-sectional as
well as on the time dimensions.
Our data regarding interest rates are not disaggregated geographically. As a
consequence, banks which are active in more than one canton — and which may
follow a geographically diﬀerentiated interest rate policy — cannot be accounted
for properly. Hence, we decided to conduct our analysis on the basis of two
diﬀerent sample deﬁnitions. First, we included all the banks10, i.e. implicitly
assuming that banks active in more than one canton adopt a uniform pricing
policy at the national level. Second, we restricted our sample to banks active
in one canton only.11
The results from our estimations are summarized in table 3 (mortgage) and 4
(deposits) respectively. The results from a panel estimation with ﬁxed-eﬀects by
banks are reported in column1 — all banks — and 3 — banks active in one canton
only — while column 2 and 4 contain the results from the pooled estimation. In
panel A of both tables, we report the results of the estimation where portfolio
and/or bank characteristics are not controlled for, while we report the results
from the full speciﬁcations given by (1) and (2) in panel B. The estimated
values for αI
1 and αI
2 in equation (1) and (2) — the parameters of interest — are
reported in rows 1 and 3 (variable ICB∆LIBOR) of each panel respectively and
the p-values for those parameters are reported in rows 2 and 4 respectively.
Four results are of particular interest. First, as expected, it appears that αI
1
is positive and statistically highly signiﬁcant. That is, there is a positive and
systematic correlation between changes in the opportunity cost of funds and the
interest rate charged by banks on their mortgages or paid on their deposits. In
the mortgage case, the value of the average pass-through rate lies between 0.286
— when the portfolio characteristics and in particular the constraints regarding
interest rate adjustments are not taken into account — and 0.474 are controlled
for. In the deposits case, the ﬁgures lie between 0.269 and 0.304. In words, these
9The hadimvo procedure identiﬁes multiple outliers in multivariate data using the method
of Hadi (1992, 1994). We set the the signiﬁcance level for outlier cutoﬀ at p = .001.
10Bank categories for which mortgage loans and/or savings and investment deposits are not
a core activity were excluded from our sample. See the appendix for an exact deﬁnition of
the sample considered.
11Egli and Rime (1999) follow this approach in their analysis of competition in the Swiss
banking sector.
11ﬁgures suggest that a 100 pb increase in the opportunity cost of funds leads to
an adjustment in the banks’ interest rates of about 30 to 40 bp on average after
one year.
Second, our data provide some evidence that, in the mortgage market, the
CBs’ pass-through rate is higher than their privately owned counterparts. When
controlling for portfolio characteristics (table 3, panel B), we can reject the
hypothesis α
M,I
2 =0against the alternative α
M,I
2 > 0 in three cases out of four.
The diﬀerence is not only signiﬁcant in the statistical sense: our ﬁgures suggest
that — when statistically signiﬁcant — the CBs’ pass-through rate exceeds the
average by about 12% to 19%. However, this ﬁnding which is consistent with
the hypothesis that CBs’ conduct is (i) diﬀerent and (ii) is more in line with
marginal cost pricing than their privately-owned counterparts, has to be put
into perspective in the light of the third and fourth results.
Three, the banks’ pass-through rate in general — and the CBs’ in particular
—a r ef a rb e l o w1, i.e. the value of the marginal cost pricing theoretical pass-




2 =1can be strongly rejected in favour of the alternative
αI
1 < 1 and αI
1+αI
2 < 1 for both markets.12 In the mortgage market, for instance,
the CBs’ short-run pass-through rate is only about 50% even when controlling
for contractual restriction regarding price adjustability. This result is consistent
with the assumption that banks in Switzerland — including state-owned banks
—b e n e ﬁt from (and take advantage of) some degree of market power.
Four, as can be seen from table 4 (panels A and B), the CBs’ pass-through
rate in the deposits market is systematically smaller than the industry’s average:
the hypothesis α
S,I
2 =0can be rejected in favour of the alternative α
S,I
2 < 0.
This result suggests that CBs’ conduct in the deposits market if further away
from marginal cost pricing than the industry average. In addition, the magni-











and the result appears more robust: contrary
to the mortgage case, the direction as well as the signiﬁcance of the results in
the deposits case does not depend either on the inclusion of a control variable
or on the estimation strategy or sample deﬁnition adopted.
Regarding the bank speciﬁc control variables RISK and SAVINGS, the
evidence is mixed. The expected positive correlation between the riskiness and
the interest rate of a mortgage portfolio is strongly supported by our data when
the larger sample deﬁnition is adopted. The same is true for the expected neg-
ative correlation between the share of savings to total deposits and the interest
rate on deposits, reﬂecting the higher interest rate paid on average, in our sam-
ple, on savings deposits. However, when estimating our model based on banks
active in one canton only, these relationships are no longer statistically signif-
icant. Finally, the assumption that changes in the interest rates on mortgage
should be (positively) correlated with changes in the level of economic activity
at the cantonal level is not supported by our data.
12T h en u l lh y p o t h e s i si sr e j e c t e da tl e v e l so fs i g n i ﬁcance which are lower than 1% in all
cases.
12Table 3: Test of hypothesis 1 (mortgages)
[Insert table 3 about here]
Table 4: Test of hypothesis 1 (deposits)
[Insert table 4 about here]
6 Hypothesis 2: interest rate levels
In this section, we test the hypothesis of equal pricing against the alternative
that state-owned banks charge relatively customer friendly interest rates on their
mortgages and/or investment and savings deposits.
6.1 Mortgage loans: speciﬁcation






1 ICB + α
II,M





4 BRANCH + α
II,M
5 ASSETS + α
II,M
6 ∆GDP + εII (4)
where rM, ICB, RISK, FREE and ∆GDP are deﬁned as above.
The parameter of interest is α
II,M
1 , which measures any systematic deviation
between the average interest rate charged by CBs and the rest of the banking
sector. We test the null-hypothesis α
II,M
1 =0against the alternative α
II,M
1 < 0,
i.e. we test if CBs charge a lower than average interest rate on their mortgage
portfolio. To control for diﬀerence in price that reﬂect diﬀerences in riskiness




In addition, we include the variable FREE, as the average interest rate
charged on a portfolio might depend on its characteristics regarding the degree
of ﬂexibility of interest rates adjustment. The sign of α
II,M
3 could be positive
or negative: ceteris paribus, one would expect a portfolio which is subject to
less restrictions regarding interest rates adjustability to be characterized by a
relatively low average interest rate in an environment were the marginal cost of
funds is decreasing and a relatively high average interest rate in an environment
were the marginal cost of funds is increasing.
Further, we include the variable BRANCH —t h er a t i oo fb a n ki0s branches
in canton j to the sum of branches in that canton — as a proxy for service quality.
As was underlined in section 3, geographical distance seems to matter in banking
competition. A stronger geographical presence can be seen as a substitute for
a lower interest rates on mortgages. Hence, we expect α
II,M
4 to be positive.
We also include a size variable ASSETS — a measure of a banks’ assets — as
an indirect way to account for additional heterogeneity in the banks’ mortgage
13portfolio that might be price relevant, with no a priori regarding the sign of
α
II,M
5 . For instance, bigger banks might on average lend to bigger lenders with
speciﬁc characteristics regarding riskiness — besides the dimension covered by
RISK — or demand elasticity. ASSETS might also account for diﬀerences in
pricing that reﬂect size related diﬀerences in cost eﬃciency. Finally ∆GDP is
included, following the same line of arguments as above, i.e. considering that,
ceteris paribus, more growth in a given canton might imply more demand for


















where all the variables have been previously deﬁned
Again, the parameter of interest is α
II,S
1 , which measures any systematic
deviation from the industry average in the interest rate paid by CBs on deposits.
We test the null-hypothesis α
II,S
1 =0against the alternative α
II,S
1 > 0, i.e. we
test the hypothesis that CBs pay a higher than average interest rate on their
deposits. To control for diﬀerence in price that reﬂect diﬀerences in the portfolio
structure rather than conduct, we include the variable SAVINGS.
A positive sign for α
II,S
2 is expected, reﬂecting the fact that during the period
covered, the interest rate on savings deposits tends to exceed the interest rate
on investment deposits. Further, we expect α
II,S
3 to be negative, as the variable
BRANCH — which is a proxy for service quality — can be seen as a substitute
for a higher interest rates on deposits. Following a similar line of arguments as
for mortgage loans, we include the size variable ASSETS as an indirect way
to account for additional heterogeneity in the banks’ mortgage portfolio that




We apply the same methodology to estimate the parameters of (3) and (5)
(OLS after elimination of outliers and robust standard errors). We conduct
our estimations with and without cantonal-level ﬁxed eﬀects. When including
cantonal-level ﬁxed eﬀects, we allow for unexplained diﬀerences in the average
interest rates between cantons. Hence, in that case, αII
1 is to be interpreted as
the average spread between the CBs’ pricing relatively to the average pricing
in the canton they are active in. In other words, αII
1 allows us to assess if the
conditions applied by state-owned banks to their borrowers or lenders system-
atically deviate from the conditions applied by their competitors in the same
local (cantonal) market. When pooling the data, αII
1 is to be interpreted as the
systematic deviation between the pricing followed by state-owned banks and the
industry average at the national level.
14The results from our estimations are summarized in table 5 (mortgages)
and 6 (deposits) respectively. The results from a panel estimation with ﬁxed-
eﬀects by canton are reported in column1 — all banks — and 3 — banks active
in one canton only — while column 2 and 4 contain the results from the pooled
estimation. In panel A of both tables, we report the results of the estimation
where portfolio and/or bank characteristics are not controlled for, while we
report the results from the full speciﬁcations given by (3) and (5) in panel B.
The estimated values for αII
1 in equation (3) and (5) — the parameters of interest
— are reported in rows 1 and 3 (variable ICB) of each panel respectively and the
p-values for those parameters are reported in rows 2 and 4 respectively.
As can be seen from tables 5 and 6, our results suggest that, under the line,
state-owned CBs do not appear to adopt a more consumer friendly pricing than
their competitors. If anything, CBs appear to be less consumer friendly than
the average bank in Switzerland. Regarding mortgage loans, the evidence is
mixed. Overall, the CB’s charge a higher than average interest rate on their
mortgage portfolio: in panel A of table 7, α
II,M
1 =0can be rejected in favour of
the alternative α
II,M
1 > 0 at a 10% level of signiﬁcance or lower. This diﬀerence,
however, appears to reﬂect diﬀerences in the portfolios’ or banks’ characteristics
like riskiness and quality (branch density). Once controlling for those charac-
teristics, the interest rate diﬀerence is no longer statistically signiﬁcant. In one
case (banks active in one canton only, ﬁxed eﬀects) the results are even con-
sistent with the assumption 2, i.e. α
II,M
1 =0can be rejected in favour of the
alternative α
II,M
1 < 0 at an acceptable level of signiﬁcance (10%). This case
however constitutes the exception rather than the rule. Regarding savings and
investment deposits, the evidence that CBs are less consumer friendly than av-
erage is compelling: the interest paid by CBs on their savings and investment
deposits are systematically lower, i.e. the assumption α
II,S
1 =0can be rejected
in favour of the alternative α
II,S
1 < 0 independently of the speciﬁcation adopted
at levels of signiﬁcance that are in general much below 1% a n di na l lc a s e sb e l o w
5%. The size of the cantonal bank negative premium lies between 13 and 27
b a s i sp o i n t so ra b o u t7% and 15% of the average interest rate depending on the
speciﬁcation adopted.
Regarding the control variables, the evidence is mixed. Considering the
mortgage market, the parameters measuring the role of the variable RISK and
BRANCH are positive (whenever signiﬁcant). This is consistent with the a
priori that mortgage portfolios (i) containing a relatively large share of second
and third rank mortgages and (ii) associated with a higher quality of service,
should be characterized by higher than average interest rates. Considering the
savings market, diﬀerences in interest rates — and in particular the negative
premium on CB’s deposits — do not appear to reﬂect systematic diﬀerences
in the density of banks’ branches: the parameter measuring the eﬀect of the
variable BRANCH is statistically signiﬁcantly from zero at an acceptable level
of signiﬁcance (10%) in one case only (banks active in one canton only, pooled)
and, in that case, shows the wrong sign. Interestingly, whenever signiﬁcant,
the size variable (lnASSETS) consistently suggests that — controlling for other
15characteristics — bigger banks oﬀer less consumer friendly conditions both in the
market for mortgages (α
II,M
5 > 0) and on deposits (α
II,S
4 < 0). While we do
not formally test this assumption, this result is consistent with the bigger banks
beneﬁtting from (and taking advantage of) higher than average levels of market
power.
Table 5: Test of hypothesis 2 (mortgages)
[Insert table 5 about here]
Table 6: Test of hypothesis 2 (deposits)
[Insert table 6 about here]
7 Hypothesis 3: Impact on competing banks’
conduct
In this section, we test the hypothesis that privately-owned banks’ pricing does
not depend on the presence of state-owned banks against the alternative that
privately owned banks adopt a more consumer friendly policy when facing the
competition of a strong state-owned bank.
7.1 Mortgage loans: speciﬁcation









2 CONCM + α
III,M
3 ICB + (6)
α
III,M




6 ASSETS + α
III,M
7 ∆GDP + εIII,M
where the variables r,ICB,RISK,FREE, ASSETS and GDP have all been
previously deﬁned. The variable MSM
CB measures the share of CBs in the mort-
gage market of the canton it is active in and CONCM is the Herﬁndahl con-
centration index in the mortgage market, we use an indicator for market power
in that canton.
The parameter of interest is α
III,M
1 . We test the null-hypothesis α
III,M
1 =0
against the alternative α
III,M
1 < 0, i.e. that privately owned banks adopt
a more consumer friendly pricing in cantons where state-owned banks own a
larger share of the mortgage market. We estimate (6), using a panel approach
and focusing on the so-called between eﬀects, where a group is deﬁned as a
canton. In other words, we try to explain the extent to which diﬀerences between
cantons regarding in particular the market share of state-owned banks and the
level of market concentration in the market for mortgages are correlated with
16diﬀerences regarding mortgage pricing in that market.13 A negative α
III,M
1
would mean that, on average, cantons where state-owned banks own a larger
market share are also those cantons where banks tend to oﬀer better conditions
to their borrowers
We include the variable CONC to control for the potential impact of market
concentration on interest rates. The regression of interest rates on a measure
of concentration is a standard approach in the structure-performance litera-
ture14. According to the industrial organization literature, α
III,M
2 , the parame-
ter reﬂecting the eﬀect of market concentration on the interest rate level in the
mortgage market could be positive, negative or zero. A positive value for α
III,M
2
would be in line with the so-called structure-conduct-performance theory, which
states that higher levels of concentration are primarily associated with higher
levels of market power which in turn lead to higher price levels. On the other
hand, higher levels of concentration might reﬂect the survival of the most ef-
ﬁcient banks in a competitive market characterized by substantial economies
of scale. Hence, a canton where the concentration is high might be a canton
where only the most eﬃcient and relatively large banks have survived. Under
the assumption of a suﬃcient level of competition, such a structure might be
associated with lower interest rates on mortgages. If α
III,M
2 is zero, this may
indicate either that those two eﬀects compensate themselves or would also be
consistent with the so-called contestable market theory (Baumol et al. 1982):
due to the threat of entry, the ﬁrms in the market are not able to exploit their
market power in a sustainable equilibrium, where a sustainable market equi-
librium is deﬁn e da sas i t u a t i o nw h e nn oe n t r yw o u l db ep r o ﬁtable given the
equilibrium price.
Regarding the additional control variables, based on the line of arguments





5 (FREE) and α
III,M
6 (ASSETS) to be positive, while
we do not expect the economic activity (∆GDP) to play a signiﬁcant role.
Finally, the dummy variable ICB is included in the speciﬁcation to correct for
the impact of CBs’ own price on the cantonal average.
7.2 Savings and investment deposits : speciﬁcation








2 CONCS + α
III,S
3 ICB + (7)
α
III,S
4 SAVINGS + α
III,S
5 ASSETS + εIII,S
where MSS
CB and CONCS measure the market share of CBs and the concen-
tration in the deposits market respectively and all other variables have been
previously deﬁned.
13Note that using this approach implies using averages that are not-weighted by the market
shares of the diﬀerent banks.
14See Berger and Hannan (1989), among others.
17The parameter of interest is α
III,S
1 and we test the null-hypothesis α
III,M
1 =
0 against the alternative α
III,M
1 > 0, i.e. that privately owned banks adopt a
more consumer friendly pricing in cantons where state-owned banks own a larger
share of the deposits market. In line with the approach adopted for mortgages,
we estimate the parameters of (7) focusing on the "between eﬀect", i.e. on the
extent to which diﬀerences between cantons regarding in particular the market
share of state-owned banks or the level of market concentration in the deposits
market are correlated with diﬀerences regarding pricing in that market.
The discussion regarding the impact of concentration based on the mort-
gage market also applies to the deposits market, with opposite signs however:
α
III,S
2 < 0 would be in line with the assumption that higher levels of con-
centration are primarily associated with higher levels of market power, while
α
III,S
2 > 0 would be consistent with the idea that only the most eﬃcient banks
survive in a competitive market characterized by substantial economies of scale.
Regarding the remaining control variables, based on the line of arguments devel-
oped in the previous sections and the results obtained so far, we expect α
III,S
4
(SAVINGS) to be positive and α
III,M
5 (ASSETS) to be negative.
7.3 Results
One potential problem has to be highlighted before turning to the results: while
the conduct of other banks and hence the average interest rate in a given canton
might depend on the market share of the state-owned bank in that canton, this
market share in turn is likely to depend on the pricing adopted by the rest
of the banking sector in that canton. As a consequence, the market share
of the state-owned bank will not be independent of the shocks that aﬀect the
interest rates (εIII,M and εIII,S respectively), violating a basic rule under which
the parameters of (6) and (7) could be estimated using OLS. To address this
simultaneity issue, we estimate the parameters of (6) and (7) using a two-stage
procedure, whereby we instrument the market share of the cantonal bank using
the CBs’ (lagged) number of branches measured as a percentage of the sum of all
bank branches in the canton it is active in. This instrument is highly correlated
with the contemporaneous market-share of the state-owned bank15 but should
be orthogonal to contemporaneous shocks aﬀecting the interest rates.16
The estimation results for hypothesis 3 are reported in table 7 and 8. We
report both the results based on the OLS (columns 1 and 3) and the instru-
mental variables (columns 2 and 4) estimation method respectively. As was
already mentioned, we estimate the parameters of both (6) and (7) using a
panel-approach and focusing on the between eﬀect.




1 ,w eﬁnd no evidence
in support of the hypothesis that privately owned banks adopt a more consumer
15The correlation is 0.79 and 0.81 in the mortgages and deposits market respectively.
16To address a similar issue, Feinberg (2002) uses a diﬀerent approach: he substitutes the
market share on the loans market by the market share on the deposits market, considering
that it is unlikely that a bank’s loan pricing decision would have a signiﬁcant impact on its
share of deposits in that market, while market shares on both markets should be correlated.
18friendly pricing in cantons where state-owned banks own a larger share of the
market. The assumption αIII
1 =0can never be rejected in favour of the alter-
native α
III,M
1 < 0 and α
III,S
1 > 0 respectively. In fact, when considering the
mortgage market (table 7) αIII
1 =0can systematically be rejected in favour
of the alternative that privately owned banks adopt a less consumer friendly
pricing in cantons where state-owned banks own a larger share. In the case of
deposits, the size of the CBs’ market share does not appear to interfere with
the privately-owned banks conduct in any systematic way.
Two additional results are worth underlying. First, in the mortgage mar-
ket, the interest rates appear to be systematically lower in cantons where the
mortgage market is more concentrated. This ﬁnding is consistent with the ef-
ﬁciency hypothesis, i.e. that higher levels of concentration are primarily the
result of natural selection in industries characterized by substantial economies
of scale. In the deposits market, the role of market concentration is less marked
but it also tends to be consistent with the eﬃciency hypothesis. This result is
in line with Egli and Rime (1999), who ﬁnd evidence supporting the eﬃciency
hypothesis for both markets, over the 1989—1997 period.17 Second, most of the
remaining control variables appear to play no signiﬁcant role. This situation
is somewhat surprising, in particular in the light of the robustness of the role
played by a variable like RISK in our previous results. However, the stability
of the value and the signiﬁcance taken by the estimate of α
III,M
1 , regardless of
the speciﬁcation adopted, suggests that the lack of signiﬁcance of the control
variable is not too much of a concern, i.e. is not a signal for a major drawback
in the estimation.
Finally, as a robustness check, we used an alternative endogenous variable,
namely the average interest rate at the cantonal level weighted by the market
share of the individual banks in that canton. So far, our speciﬁcations implied
a comparison of the unweighted average interest rate between canton. To some
extent however, the use of the weighted average appears more appropriate in
this context, as the relevant issue is to know whether CBs have an impact on
the average interest rate paid by borrowers or received by depositors in a given
canton. However, the use of the weighted average comes at a cost. Given the
high levels of concentration at the cantonal level, the weighted average mainly
reﬂects the interest charged, respectively oﬀered, by the main 2 or 3 banks active
in that canton, among which at least one is active at the national level. As was
already made clear, we had to assume that this latter category of banks follows
a uniform pricing policy, due to the lack of pricing information at the cantonal
level. As a consequence, the use of weighted averages considerably reduces the
variability of the interest rates between cantons. Acknowledging these reserva-
tions, we tested this third hypothesis using the alternative endogenous variable
deﬁnition. It turns out that our results are robust to such a change. None of the
estimates for the variable of interest was aﬀected by the change in a material
17Egli and Rime (1999) further investigate this issue, concluding that the eﬃciency hypoth-
esis applies only in the smaller cantons. For the large cantons, the structure-performance
hypothesis cannot be rejected for savings for mortgages while both the structure-performance
as well as the market-eﬃciency hypothesis is rejected for mortgages.
19way.
Table 7: Test of hypothesis 3 (mortgages)
[Insert table 7 about here]
Table 8: Test of hypothesis 3 (deposits)
[Insert table 8 about here]
8 Summary of results and limitations
We tested three hypothesis that correspond to diﬀerent aspects of the same
question: are state owned cantonal banks special in such a way that they play
a particular role as competition enhancers? The vast majority of our results
speak against this view. First, based on pass-through rates, there is only lim-
ited evidence that cantonal banks’ conduct is more in line with marginal cost
pricing than their privately-owned counterparts’. In general, the conduct of
both categories of banks regarding interest rate adjustment to shocks aﬀecting
ﬁnancing costs do not diﬀer systematically or, quite surprisingly, the opposite
result emerges. Second, based on interest rate levels,i ta p p e a r st h a t ,i fa n y -
thing, cantonal banks oﬀer interest rates that are less favorable to consumers
than the average bank in Switzerland. Third, we do not ﬁnd evidence that
cantonal banks have a positive — from the borrower’s or lender’s point of view —
eﬀect on their competitors’ conduct, as those cantons where state-owned banks’
market share is relatively high do not beneﬁt from relatively low interest rates
on their mortgages. Again, if anything, the opposite appears to be true. Before
turning to the policy implications of these ﬁndings, four limitations have to be
highlighted.
First, the scope of our analysis is limited by data availability. In particular,
the absence of data on pricing for this category of loans prevented us from
including the market for non-mortgage corporate loans into our analysis. One
cannot exclude a priori that the conduct of cantonal banks in this market would
be diﬀerent from their conduct in the two markets covered by our study, in
a sense that would be more in line with their mandate and our expectations.
While we are not in a position to test this hypothesis explicitly, we deem it
unlikely as most of the cantonal banks’ mandates do not mention categories of
loans or deposits that should be given particular support.
Second, the R2 of our regressions are relatively low. In particular, when fo-
cusing on the interest rate levels (hypothesis 2), the R2 ﬂuctuate between 13%
and 26%, depending on the speciﬁcation considered. This means that the vari-
ables included in our model explain only about 20% of the variability (across
time and between banks) of the interest rate levels. This suggests that poten-
tially important control variables are missing from our analysis. In particular,
20on the deposits side, we are unable to correct for the duration of the portfolios
while, on the mortgage side, this correction is somewhat rudimentary. Hence,
we cannot exclude that (the absence of) diﬀerences in interest rates between
the cantonal banks and the rest of the industry reﬂects unobserved diﬀerences
in portfolio characteristics rather than (the absence of) diﬀerences in conduct.
This is unlikely, however, as the observed variables suggest that cantonal banks’
portfolio characteristics are similar to those of the average bank in Switzerland.
Third, our analysis focuses mainly on interest rates, which constitute one
dimension of banking services only. We do not account for diﬀerences in com-
missions — another important component of the price of banks’ services — and
control only for one aspect of service quality, namely branch density. Regarding
commissions, anecdotal evidence suggest that cantonal banks indeed tend to
charge relatively cheap. Regarding service quality, cantonal banks are so called
universal banks and, as such, oﬀer a large scope of banking services, which is
one important aspect of service quality. Another important aspect of quality is
the, sometimes explicit, guarantee oﬀered by cantonal banks on their deposits.
The existence of this guarantee might be a main driving factor explaining the
observed negative premium on CB’s deposits. Taking these elements into ac-
count might hence shift the picture in favour of the cantonal banks. This shift
should be of limited magnitude, however, in particular in the market for mort-
gages, as mortgage loans are standardized products, for which the interest rate
undoubtly represents the main component of the (quality adjusted) total cost
of the bank service.
Finally, it remains questionable if we succeeded in achieving the ambitious
objective set by our third hypothesis: determine the extent to which the con-
duct of privately-owned banks depends on the presence of state-owned banks
among their competitors. Ideally, we would like to assess what would be the
consequences, in terms of interest rates, of skipping the cantonal banks from the
Swiss banking landscape. As was highlighted in our illustrative example (see
s e c t i o n3 ) ,t h e r es h o u l db et w oe ﬀects: an increase in the market concentration
and, possibly, a change in the conduct of the other banks due to the disappearing
of the "cantonal bank’s eﬀect". The speciﬁcation we adopted should cover both
eﬀects. However, the capturing of the second eﬀect requires a measure of the
intensity of the presence of the cantonal bank, which is endogenous and reﬂects,
among other things, the conduct of the other banks. While we tried to address
this endogeneity problem, doubts remain that our attempt was successful.
9 Discussion and policy implications
The starting point of our analysis was to consider that, because of a diﬀerent
objective function, one would expect the state-owned cantonal banks’ conduct
to deviate from the typical conduct in the banking sector in some measurable
way. More precisely, we expected cantonal banks’ interest rates to be relatively
sensitive to common cost movements and we also expected cantonal banks to
charge relatively low interest rates on mortgages and oﬀer relatively high interest
21rates on deposits. In addition, we expected cantonal banks’ deviating conduct to
interfere with, and aﬀect their competing banks’ conduct. Our results suggest
that, under the line, these expectations are not supported by the data. In
particular, our results provide ample evidence that cantonal banks pay lower
than average interest rates on their deposits. One explanation for this result —
besides the exercise of market power for which our data provides some evidence
—i st h a ti ti st h er e ﬂect of the (explicit or implicit) state guarantee oﬀered to
cantonal banks.
Hence, based on the available data, cantonal banks do not appear to fulﬁll
their mandate: they do neither adopt a customer friendly conduct nor intensify
competition in any special way. In other words, cantonal banks can not be
credited with the moderate pricing that is observed in the Swiss banking sector
despite of the unusually high level of concentration in international comparison.
Based on these results, a potentially important argument in favour of keeping —
a n di ng e n e r a ls u b s i d i z i n g—as y s t e mo fs t a t e - o w n e db a n k s ,n a m e l yt h a tt h e y
play a central role as competition enhancers in concentrated banking markets
appears empirically unfounded. And, as we underlined in the introduction,
the question of the rationale of maintaining widespread state-ownership is not
limited to Switzerland as, according to La Porta (2002), almost half of the
equity of the 10 largest banks in each country, worldwide, was owned by the
government in 1995.
It is important to underline however that our analysis does not cover the
market of non-mortgage corporate loans. It can not be a priori excluded that
cantonal banks indeed play an important role as competition enhancers in this
market. In addition, banks in Switzerland are currently in the process of reﬁning
their pricing strategy, in particular in order to better account for heterogeneity
regarding riskiness. A by-product of this process could be that besides riskiness,
banks’ pricing in the future will better reﬂect the heterogeneity regarding de-
mand elasticities. As a consequence, the value of cantonal banks as competition
enhancer might well increase in the future. In other words, the time may be
badly chosen to get rid of cantonal banks. However our ﬁndings suggest that
cantonal banks should be put under stronger scrutiny regarding the fulﬁllment
of their mandate by their respective owners.
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24Appendix 1: data
Databases
The data used in this study were obtained from three diﬀerent sources:
• For bank related data we use end-of year individual-bank data on mort-
gage loans from the Swiss National Bank’s banking statistics database.
The database contains data on mortgage loans and savings and invest-
ment deposits holdings and number of branches for each banks in each
canton. In addition, the database contains data on the average interest
rates charged on the mortgage portfolio and oﬀered on the deposits port-
folio as well as other balance sheet items for each bank at the nationwide
level. Cantonal distribution of mortgage loans is deﬁned after the location
of the issuing bank. This database is conﬁdential.
• The measure of economic activity at the cantonal level (GDP)s t e m sf r o m
BAK Basel Economics.
• T h ed a t ao n3 0d a y si n t e r b a n ki n t e r e s tr a t e s( LIBOR)s t e m sf r o mR e u t e r s .
Sample deﬁnition
Our sample covers the 1996—2002 with a yearly frequency. The choice of the
period was primarily guided by the availability of data regarding the riskiness
and the price adjustability of the individual banks’ mortgage portfolios.
The sample selection was made using the categorization proposed by the
Swiss national bank. Banks belonging to the following categories were included:
cantonal banks, big banks, saving and regional banks, raiﬀeisen banks and trad-
ing banks; hence, we excluded banks belonging to categories for which the mort-
gage and the deposits do not constitute a main source of income. Details regard-
ing the deﬁnition of the bank categories can be found in the statistical yearbook
of the Swiss banks18.
Variables deﬁnition
Data at cantonal level
CONCM and CONCS a r et h et h eH e r ﬁndahl index of concentration in
the mortgage and the deposits market respectively for each canton and each
time period. It is based on individual banks’ mortgage loans and savings and





where MSi is the share of bank i in the relevant market of a particular canton,
i.e. MSi = Li P
i Li where Li measures bank i0s nominal amount of mortgage
loans, respectively savings and investment deposits, outstanding in this canton.
MSM
CB and MSS
CB measure the share of the cantonal bank in the relevant
market of a given canton.
18The yearbook is a Swiss national bank publication and can be downloaded free of charge
under the following address: www.snb.ch/e/publikationen/publi.html.
25∆GDP measures the growth rate of the cantonal gross domestic product in
deviation to the average national GDP growth rate.
Data at the individual bank level
ASSETS is the natural logarithm of a bank’s domestic assets, in million
CHF.
BRANCH is the natural logarithm of the ratio of bank i0s branches in
canton j to the sum of bank branches in that canton.
FREE is the share of a bank’s mortgage portfolio which is not subject to
any interest rate adjustment time-constraint, i.e. FREE =
˜ L
L where ˜ L is the
stock of mortgage loans which is not subject to any interest rate adjustment
time-constraint.
ICB is dummy variable which takes value one when a bank is a cantonal
bank and zero otherwise.
rM and rS are the interest rates charged on mortgages loans, respectively
oﬀered on the savings and investment deposits, and measured at the individual
bank level.
RM = rM
FREE i is the adjusted interest rate on the mortgage portfolio.
RISK measures the sum of the second and third rank mortgages as a fraction
of the total mortgage loan portfolio of a bank. The rank of a mortgages is
determined by its loan to value ratio where the upper limit of the ratio is 2/3
and 8/10 for ﬁrst and second rank mortgages respectively. Third rank mortgages
are not subject to a maximal loan to value limits.
Data at the national level
ICB∆LIBOR is the product between the cantonal bank dummy and the
change in the LIBOR variable.
LIBOR is the three-months London Interbank Oﬀer Rate, the reference
interest rate of the Swiss National Bank. It is computed as the yearly average
of the daily rates.
TIME is a linear function of the date.
26Appendix 2: illustrative example
We assume a ”linear city” à la Hotelling (1929) of length 1 which is home to a
continuum of uniformly distributed borrowers indexed by i. Each agent i borrows
one unit (i.e. the individual and aggregate demand for loans in the economy is
inelastic) and is characterized by the following indirect utility function:
Wi = ¯ W − r − (xi − aj)
2
where ¯ W is an arbitrarily large positive constant, r i st h ei n t e r e s tr a t ea n d
(xi − aj)
2 is the quadratic ”transportation cost” incurred by the borrower due
to the distance he has to travel to reach its lender. The market is served by
3 banks, labelled (and located at) a1,a 2 and a3 and facing constant (zero)
marginal cost. Without loss of generality, we assume that
0 ≤ a1 ≤ a2 ≤ a3 ≤ 1.
The demand faced by each bank in this set-up is standard:








if X1 > 0 and 0 otherwise (8)





















if X2 > 0 and 0 otherwise (10)











if X3 > 0 and 0 otherwise. (12)
Banks compete sequentially in location and in interest rates. We consider
3d i ﬀerent cases. In the ﬁrst case, 2 proﬁt maximizing banks compete with a
state-owned zero proﬁt bank. In case 2 — where the locations are exogenous —
and case 3 — where the locations are endogenous — there are 3 proﬁt maximizing
banks.
Case 1
In this case, 2 proﬁt-maximizing banks compete with a zero-proﬁts t a t e -
owned bank. We arbitrarily assume that the state-owned bank locates at the
center of the city.19 Formally, we assume that the state-owned bank charges an
interest rate r2 =0and is located at a2 = .5.
The privately owned banks maximize: Πj = Djrj where Dj for j =1 ,2 is
given by (8) and (9) respectively by choosing their locations in the ﬁrst stage
19Under this condition, there is no direct interaction between the two proﬁt maximising
banks, i.e. each proﬁt maximising bank competes only competes with the (passive) state-
owned bank and not directly with the other proﬁt maximising bank. This assumption simpli-
ﬁes the computation without aﬀecting the core outcome of the model.
27and then, given the locational structure, by choosing the interest rate charged.
We solve the game backwards.




































The optimal locations are obtained by substituting (13) and (14) into the proﬁt
function and maximizing with respect to a1 and a2 respectively. The interior















Using these results together with a2 = .5 and r2 =0 , implies:






that is, the state-owned bank serves two-thirds of the market and hence the
proﬁts and the average interest rate in the economy are:


























































28In this case, we assume that the locational structure is identical to case 1,
but all 3 banks are now proﬁt maximizers. Formally, we maximize the proﬁt























D1 = D3 =
5
18



















I nt h i sc a s e ,w ea s s u m et h a t3p r o ﬁt maximizers compete both in interest
rates (stage 2) and in location (stage 1).20 Formally, we ﬁrst maximize the proﬁt
function (??)u s i n gt h ei n t e r e s tr a t ea sa r g u m e n tf o rj =1 ,2,3, which yields
the following reaction functions:























































































20This corresponds to a standard Hotelling with 3 players set-up (see for example XX).
29In the second stage, we maximize the proﬁt function (??) evaluated at equilib-

















D1 = D3 =
13
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30Appendix 3: pass-through rates
Proposition 2 We assume a market for banking loans with N proﬁt maximiz-
ing banks and K zero-proﬁt (state-owned) banks. Both categories of banks are
identical except for their objective function. We further assume that this market
is characterized by (i) product diﬀerentiation, (ii) Nash-competition in interest
rates, (iii) non-zero price-elasticity of individual and total demand functions










where rj is the Nash-equilibrium interest rate charged by the N proﬁt-maximizing
banks, ˙ r is the opportunity cost of funds and r∗
k is the equilibrium interest rate
charged by zero-proﬁt (state-owned) banks.
Proof. We assume that N proﬁt maximizing and K not for proﬁtb a n k sc o m -
pete in a diﬀerentiated products environment. The individual demand faced
by bank i is xi (ri, ˙ r) where ri is the interest rate charged by bank i, and ˙ r is
the N + K − 1 vector of interest rates charged by the competitors. We assume
that the marginal cost of producing banking services is given by the perfectly
competitive interbank market rate m. Hence, the proﬁt function can be written
as:
Πi = xi (ri, ˙ r)(ri − m). (15)
Assuming a non-cooperative behavior, bank i ∈ N will choose ri in order
to maximize (15), taking other banks’ interest rates as given, i.e. satisfying the




∂xi (ri, ˙ r)
∂ri
(ri − m)+xi =0 . (16)
Assuming that there is a unique function r∗
i∈N (m, ˙ r) that satisﬁes (16) and that
a symmetric Nash equilibrium with r∗
i (m, ˙ r)=r∗
j (m, ˙ r)=r∗
N (m) ∀i,j ∈ N
and r∗



























where ˙ r∗ = {r∗
N (m,ri),m} is a N − 1+K vector of reaction functions.
We further assume that the individual demand function satisﬁes two weak





and second, we assume that the direct (negative) eﬀect on the individual demand
resulting from an interest rate increase is less than compensated by the indirect
31(positive) eﬀect due to the increase of the competitors prices, i.e. we impose a






i (m, ˙ r)
∂r∗















Combining (17) and (19) implies:
∂xi
∂r∗
i (m, ˙ r)
µ
∂r∗





and hence, using (??), we have:
∂r∗
i (m, ˙ r)
∂m
< 1,∀i ∈ N
which proves proposition 1. Proposition 1 also applies in the case of the deposit
savings market. The proof, which is analogue, is available on request from the
authors.
32Appendix 4: Tables
Table 2: Summary Statistics21
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Observations 315 296 261 258 248 238 277
Interest rates on mortgage loans Mean 4.73 4.48 4.21 3.93 4.40 4.26 3.84
(variable r
M; percentage points)  Std. Dev. 0.32 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.15 0.12 0.17
Interest rates on deposits  Mean 2.13 2.01 1.78 1.61 2.11 1.83 1.45
(variable r
S; percentage points)  Std. Dev. 0.55 0.27 0.25 0.26 0.35 0.32 0.20
Concentration (mortgage market) Mean 2'458 2'494 2'837 2'800 2'731 2'780 2'498
(variable CONC
M; Herfindahl index) Std. Dev. 1'192 1'196 1'064 1'247 1'203 1'192 792
Concentration (deposit market) Mean 2'319 2'352 2'627 2'666 2'649 2'695 2'478
(variable CONC
S; Herfindahl index)  Std. Dev. 1'008 1'002 946 1'093 1'060 1'051 701
Market share of CBs (mortgage market)  Mean .35 .35 .35 .36 .36 .36 .35
(variable MS
M
CB) Std. Dev. .17 .17 .17 .18 .17 .17 .16
Market share of CBs (deposit market)  Mean .34 .33 .33 .33 .34 .34 .32
(variable MS
S
CB) Std. Dev. .16 .16 .16 .16 .16 .16 .14
Share of freely adjustable mortgage rates  Mean .66 .65 .65 .64 .70 .69 .60
(variable FREE) Std. Dev. .20 .21 .22 .22 .19 .20 .24
Share of 2nd and 3rd rank mortages  Mean .14 .12 .12 .10 .10 .09 .09
(variable RISK) Std. Dev. .11 .10 .11 .08 .07 .07 .07
Bank branches (ratio)  Mean .08 .09 .10 .10 .11 .11 .10
(variable BRANCH) Std. Dev. .11 .10 .11 .08 .07 .07 .07
Share of savings to total deposits  Mean .79 .77 .77 .76 .76 .74 .74
(variable SAVINGS) Std. Dev. .20 .23 .24 .25 .24 .25 .22
Sum of domestic assets Mean 33'100 35'600 44'000 41'000 38'400 39'900 39'500
(variable ASSETS; CHF millions) Std. Dev. 44'100 50'100 80'300 76'500 62'700 60'100 58'400
Growth of cantonal economic activity Mean -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.002
(variable GDP) Std. Dev. .02 .02 .02 .01 .01 .01 .01
3 Months interbank interest rate  1.72 1.45 1.32 1.17 2.93 2.68 0.935
(variable LIBOR)
Summary statistics (all figures are averages over all Cantons and Banks, unweighted)





∆LIBOR 0.294*** 0.286*** 0.317*** 0.317***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ICB∆LIBOR -0.031** -0.025*** -0.044** -0.044***
0.034 0.002 0.015 0.002
∆GDP -0.264 -0.632 -0.680 -0.692
0.583 0.225 0.388 0.421
TIME 0.062*** 0.053*** 0.078*** 0.077***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CONSTANT -0.393*** -0.353*** -0.481*** -0.476***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 1539 1539 770 770
Groups 334 150
R-Squared 0.76 0.69 0.76 0.72
∆LIBOR 0.479*** 0.474*** 0.428*** 0.426***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ICB∆LIBOR 0.019 0.057** 0.076*** 0.080**
0.540 0.030 0.001 0.013
∆RISK 1.665*** 1.796*** -0.905** -0.523
0.000 0.000 0.030 0.273
∆GDP -0.379 -0.731 -0.856 -1.025
0.696 0.414 0.389 0.343
TIME 0.064*** 0.059*** 0.100*** 0.099***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CONSTANT -0.504*** -0.481*** -0.658*** -0.655***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 1440 1440 712 712
Groups 26 147
R-Squared 0.64 0.64 0.74 0.73
p-values are in italics
*,**,*** indicate coefficients which are significant at, or below, the 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively
OLS Regression; Robust standard-errors
Dependant variable: ∆r
M; sample: 1996-2002






in one canton only
Panel A: WITHOUT control for portfolio characteristics





∆LIBOR 0.271*** 0.269*** 0.302*** 0.305***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ICB∆LIBOR -0.067*** -0.069*** -0.106*** -0.109***
0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000
TIME 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.036*** 0.038***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CONSTANT -0.233*** -0.235*** -0.266*** -0.272***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 1576 1576 739 739
Groups 345 141
R-Squared 0.49 0.46 0.57 0.53
∆LIBOR 0.280*** 0.277*** 0.304*** 0.304***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ICB∆LIBOR -0.070*** -0.075*** -0.105*** -0.107***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
∆SAVINGS 2.134*** 1.548*** 0.104 -0.166
0.000 0.000 0.880 0.718
TIME 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.036***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CONSTANT -0.269*** -0.266*** -0.260*** -0.266***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 1501 1501 705 705
Groups 342 138
R-Squared 0.52 0.49 0.55 0.54
p-values are in italics
*,**,*** indicate coefficients which are significant at, or below, the 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively
OLS Regression; Robust standard-errors
Dependant variable: ∆r
S; sample: 1996-2002
Panel B: WITH control for portfolio characteristics
Dependant variable: ∆r
S; sample: 1996-2002
Savings and Investment Deposits
All Banks
Banks active 
in one canton only
Panel A: WITHOUT control for portfolio characteristics





ICB 0.038* 0.035* 0.095*** 0.057**
0.091 0.063 0.008 0.013
∆GDP -0.006 -0.230 -0.024 -0.828
0.993 0.646 0.983 0.397
TIME -0.079*** -0.079*** -0.062*** -0.063***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CONSTANT 4.539*** 4.538*** 4.456*** 4.467***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 1560 1560 775 775
Groups 26 26
R-Squared 0.23 0.22 0.14 0.13
ICB -0.009 0.002 -0.094* -0.063
0.716 0.948 0.073 0.130
FREE 0.066* 0.084* 0.244*** 0.210***
0.090 0.058 0.000 0.002
RISK 0.414*** 0.426*** -0.064 0.059
0.000 0.000 0.621 0.670
ASSETS 0.001 0.003 0.042*** 0.032***
0.738 0.552 0.006 0.003
BRANCH 0.032*** 0.02*** 0.010 0.014
0.000 0.007 0.558 0.236
∆GDP -0.107 -0.077 -0.168 0.225
0.868 0.872 0.870 0.802
TIME -0.076*** -0.075*** -0.064*** -0.066***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CONSTANT 4.533*** 4.458*** 3.825*** 3.990***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 1514 1514 765 765
Groups 26 26
R-Squared 0.24 0.25 0.17 0.17
p-values are in italics
*,**,*** indicate coefficients which are significant at, or below, the 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively
OLS Regression; Robust standard-errors
Dependant variable: r
M; sample: 1996-2002






in one canton only
Panel A: WITHOUT control for portfolio and bank characteristics





ICB -0.161*** -0.200*** -0.270*** -0.313***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
TIME -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.062*** -0.063***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CONSTANT 2.100*** 2.107*** 2.220*** 2.233***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 1592 1592 741 741
Groups 26 26
R-Squared 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.21
ICB -0.193*** -0.194*** -0.131** -0.217***
0.000 0.000 0.028 0.000
SAVINGS 0.177*** 0.202*** 0.059 0.198***
0.000 0.000 0.496 0.004
ASSETS -0.041*** -0.043*** -0.037* -0.049***
0.000 0.000 0.059 0.000
BRANCH 0.009 0.007 0.002 0.022*
0.337 0.491 0.926 0.099
TIME -0.056*** -0.057*** -0.060*** -0.061***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CONSTANT 2.598*** 2.599*** 2.623*** 2.766***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 1535 1535 735 735
Groups 25 25
R-Squared 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.25
p-values are in italics
*,**,*** indicate coefficients which are significant at, or below, the 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively
OLS Regression; Robust standard-errors
Dependant variable: ∆r
S; sample: 1996-2002
Panel B: WITH control for portfolio and bank characteristics
Dependant variable: ∆r
S; sample: 1996-2002
Savings and Investment Deposits
All Banks
Banks active 
in one canton only
Panel A: WITHOUT control for portfolio and bank characteristics





MSCB 0.273*** 0.236** 0.359** 0.425**
0.006 0.027 0.047 0.045
CONC
2) -0.033** -0.031** -0.065** -0.069***
0.033 0.038 0.010 0.005
ICB -0.084 -0.047 0.064 0.053
0.689 0.827 0.371 0.475
∆GDP -1.287 -1.164 -4.718* -4.958**
0.231 0.274 0.062 0.042
TIME 0.072 0.051 -0.208 -0.209
0.563 0.692 0.153 0.136
CONSTANT 3.873*** 3.973*** 5.137*** 5.135***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 1560 1560 775 775
Groups 26 26 26 26
R-Squared 0.38 0.37 0.40 0.40
MSCB 0.261** 0.235** 0.453** 0.500**
0.012 0.038 0.012 0.014
CONC
2) -0.040** -0.038** -0.0657** -0.069***
0.021 0.029 0.014 0.007
ICB 0.385 0.369 0.107 0.105
0.347 0.356 0.297 0.295
RISK 0.609 0.617 0.535 0.526
0.239 0.218 0.221 0.213
FREE 0.160 0.150 0.308* 0.323*
0.496 0.517 0.099 0.075
∆GDP 0.006 0.048 -1.390 -1.461
0.996 0.969 0.504 0.476
log ASSETS -0.015 -0.013 0.007 0.006
0.532 0.581 0.799 0.811
TIME 0.047 0.032 -0.213*** -0.214***
0.729 0.821 0.000 0.000
CONSTANT 4.020*** 4.071*** 4.762*** 4.756***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 1552 1552 766 766
Groups 26 26 26 26
R-Squared 0.48 0.47 0.75 0.74
1) Instrumental variables estimation. 
Instrumented: MSCB
Instruments:
2) The original CONC coeficient are scaled up by a factor 1'000.
p-values are in italics
*,**,*** indicate coefficients which are significant at, or below, the 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively
Number of branches at the cantonal level
(deviation from cantonal average)
Panel A: WITHOUT control for portfolio and bank characteristics
Dependant variable: r
M; sample: 1996-2002






in one canton only
Between (cantons) effect estimation





MSCB -0.173 -0.264* -0.021 -0.178
0.177 0.066 0.928 0.531
CONC
2) 0.064** 0.072** 0.088** 0.1***
0.042 0.018 0.022 0.009
ICB -0.848** -0.795** -0.496*** -0.472***
0.022 0.023 0.000 0.000
TIME -0.343* -0.376** -0.200 -0.173
0.077 0.046 0.270 0.340
CONSTANT 3.293*** 3.440*** 2.653*** 2.545***
0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001
Observations 1592 1592 741 741
Groups 26 26 26 26
R-Squared 0.45 0.43 0.64 0.64
MSCB -0.048 -0.084 0.171 0.028
0.614 0.424 0.500 0.931
CONC
2) 0.028 0.032 0.061 0.073
0.225 0.166 0.177 0.120
ICB -0.160 -0.184 -0.325** -0.328**
0.703 0.659 0.047 0.032
SAVINGS 0.208 0.218 0.330 0.290
0.253 0.220 0.324 0.384
log ASSETS -0.060** -0.057** -0.050 -0.044
0.015 0.013 0.226 0.292
TIME -0.182 -0.201 -0.257 -0.229
0.203 0.154 0.164 0.210
CONSTANT 3.332*** 3.362*** 3.249*** 3.090***
0.000 0.000 0.005 0.003
Observations 1576 1576 735 735
Groups 25 25 25 25
R-Squared 0.77 0.77 0.70 0.70
1) Instrumental variables estimation. 
Instrumented: MSCB
Instruments:
2) The original CONC coeficient are scaled up by a factor 1'000.
p-values are in italics
*,**,*** indicate coefficients which are significant at, or below, the 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively
Number of branches at the cantonal level
(deviation from cantonal average)
Panel A: WITHOUT control for portfolio and bank characteristics
Dependant variable: ∆r
S; sample: 1996-2002
Panel B: WITH control for portfolio and bank characteristics
Dependant variable: ∆r
S; sample: 1996-2002
Savings and Investment Deposits
All Banks
Banks active 
in one canton only
Between (cantons) effect estimation
39